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ABSTRACT

Capital flight aggravates resource constraints and contributes to undermine long-

term economic growth. Counterfactual calculations on the Philippines suggest that capital flight
contributed to lower the quality of long-term economic growth. Sustained capital flight over three
decades means that capital flight had a role for the Philippines to lose the opportunities to achieve
economic takeoff. Unless decisive policy actions are taken up to address enduring capital flight
and manage the macroeconomy more effectively, the Philippines remains caught in the perpetuity
of crises, its economy hollowed-out, the people trapped in poverty, and once again, the country is
frustrated from realizing a takeoff.
Key Words
JEL Classification

Capital flight, economic growth, Philippines
E10, O40, O50

1. INTRODUCTION
Why capital is flowing out of developing countries rather than to them where resources are most
needed to finance economic growth and human development is a puzzle that has produced some
very interesting papers (see, e.g., Lucas 1990; Tornell and Velasco 1992; Alfaro et al. 2007). But,
not only is capital flowing out from developing countries, studies have also established that capital
has been fleeing developing countries in large amounts (see, e.g., Lessard and Williamson 1987;
Pastor 1990; Boyce and Ndikumana 2001; Epstein 2005). Capital flight was pronounced in the
1980s during the Latin American debt crises and again in the 1990s after a series of crises hitting
developing and transition economies. Clearly, crises propel capital to flee to seek safer places for
capital. The persistently dismal economic performances and limited possibilities such as in Africa
since the 1980s necessarily drive out capital out of these countries. Yet, during periods of robust
macroeconomic performances, research finds that capital continues to flee.
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The stylized fact is that when capital flees resources are lost to the domestic economy and
these have serious implications on long-term macroeconomic performance. Even if resources first
came in foreign investments, the fact that they enjoy implicit guarantees against losses means that
when they flee the burden is transferred from foreign to the domestic residents. Also, the stylized
fact is that capital flight is carried out by elites, while the burden of the losses is socialized. Thus,
the rest of society (i.e., non-elite) suffers from the consequences of capital flight even as the elites
protect themselves from the harm when they move elsewhere and/or shelter their wealth abroad
Indeed, the poor do not have any choice on the matter but must face the costs head-on, ending up
in a much worse situation than before because of the simple reality that the social institutions and
insurance mechanisms in developing countries are weak, if not missing. The worse part is that the
impacts persist over time. Hence, from “an economic justice point-of-view, there are distributive
dimensions to capital flight that must not be ignored” (Beja 2006a: 264).
This paper does not deal with the question where capital flight went, who was engaged in
it, or even how it was undertaken (on the latter point see, e.g., Ingo 1987; Ingo 1990; Baker 2005;
Henry 2005). The dynamics of capital flight has been analyzed using general regression analyses,
such as those by Cuddington (1987), Mikkelsen (1991), Schineller (1997a; 1997b), Harrigan et al.
(2001), and Alam and Quazi (2003), or using a specific setup like the revolving door model, such
as those by Boyce (1992), Chipalkatti and Rishi (2001), Ndikumana and Boyce (2003); Demir
(2004), Pincus and Ramli (2004), and Beja (2006b). This paper is more modest in its goal, by
focusing on one aspect of capital flight, which is to find out the costs of capital flight in terms of
long-term macroeconomic performances. More specifically, it presents results for the Philippines,
a country that has suffered from capital flight since the 1970s (see, e.g., Boyce 1992; Boyce 1993;
Vos 1993; Vos and Yap 1996; Beja 2006a; Beja 2006b; Beja 2007). The Philippines prior to the
mid-1990s was labelled as the “economic basket case of Asia”, the “sick man of Asia”, or the
“Latin American economy in Asia” because when compared to the Asian economic miracle

economies that averaged at least 7 percent economic growth rates between 1970 and 1996, the
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country was only able to manage a respectable average of 3.7 percent, which is comparable to the
averages in Latin America. In fact, the Philippines could not sustain economic growth for more
than four years, because economic busts almost always obstruct the Philippines’ prospects for
growth accelerations. Poverty indicators for the Philippines remained high over the same period,
towering those of the Asian economic miracle economies that realized drastic reductions in their
poverty indicators. The Philippines is therefore an interesting study on the elusiveness of sustained
economic expansions that also concerns many developing countries today. It is an interesting case
on why capital flight must not be ignored by the governments in policy-making and for rethinking
about re-regulation in the present context of deregulation, financial liberalization, and economic
integration. How large are the costs that capital flight has imposed on the Philippines?
The results presented in this paper suggest that capital flight has non-trivial and negative
consequences on Philippine long-term macroeconomic performances. The results also support the
contention that sustained capital flight since the 1970s meant large lost opportunities. Of course,
the results in this paper do not deny that there are also other factors that contributed to undermine
macroeconomic performances and enlarge these losses, which can be measured as well. But over
three decades of capital flight are undeniable to the contention that capital flight contributed to
the Philippines’ failure to realize an economic takeoff. If the Philippine government does not act
today – if it pretends not to see capital flight or continues to introduce policies that facilitate
capital flight – it is condemning the country to the perpetuity of crises, the continuity of narrow,
shallow and hollow macroeconomic performances, and the permanence of poverty of the Filipinos
that, in the end, the Philippines cannot again realize an economic takeoff.
2. PHILIPPINE SETTING
Studies have documented that capital flight has been a serious problem to the Philippines. Boyce
(1992), Vos (1992), Boyce (1993), Vos and Yap (1996), Beja (2006a), and Beja (2007) present
estimates of capital flight from the Philippines, and these are compiled in Table 1 below. Despite
the differences in the estimates, these studies found large amounts of capital flight from the 1970s
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to the 1990s, regardless of whether or not the Philippines was in a crisis or in a recovery phase. A
large amounts of the capital inflows (mostly, external debts) ended up squandered into kickbacks
and corruption-related activities, illicitly transferred abroad into private bank accounts and assets,
or simple fled as political conditions became increasingly unstable and the level of indebtedness
worsened. Crises also contributed to capital flight. The “reverse” capital flight in the early 1990s
(shown as a negative number in the table) is attributed to efforts of the government to introduce
wide-scale deregulation and financial liberalization programs, which were aggressively pursued
to attract foreign capital into the country and/or give the domestic players easier access to the
international capital markets. It needs to be noted, however, that after 1988, more than half of the
debt-equity conversions for the Philippines were transactions with Filipinos (see, e.g., Dytianquin
1989). By the end of the mid 1990s, there was another surge of capital flight with already more
avenues for unrecorded transactions, and were exploited quite well, and because most of the
capital inflows could not be absorbed by the economy, as well as the instabilities generated by the
crises abroad. In fact, Beja (2007) shows that capital flight continued to be high even in the mid2000s because of still similar reasons that made capital flee the Philippines in the late 1990s.
Table 1: Philippine Capital Flight (in current US$ Millions)
Period
Boyce
Vos
Vos and Yap
Beja
1970-1974
514
-183
338
-371
1975-1979
3,625
2,967
2,718
4,533
1980-1984
3,222
6,945
5,761
7,427
1985-1989
3,166
2,487
4,627
1990-1994
-1,418
1995-1999
12,400
Note: The compiled figures follow the residual method: KF = CDET+NFI-CAD-CRES+MIS. Adjustments
on both CDET and unrecorded remittances were not added (for the Beja figures) for easy comparison of the
estimates from Boyce, Vos, and Vos and Yap. Differences in the estimates are due to the differences in data
sets.

No doubt, capital flight occurred during crises in the Philippines. The balance of payment
crisis in 1983-84 triggered massive capital flight, although scholars have also pointed out that the
economy was already vulnerable to an external shock because of the weaknesses produced by the
oil price shocks, external debt build up, and political instabilities, implying that capital flight was
intensifying even before 1980. The assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 unleashed massive
4

political and social unrests against the Marcos government, and thus, capital was further propelled
to flee. The ensuring years were not easy for the Philippines with the economy plunging to its
worst state in the post-World War II period. A respite came in 1986, when Mrs. Corazon Aquino
became president after the people power revolt and riding on the high-level international
confidence on her government as democracy was re-established, raising hopes that the Philippines
could then put itself together for sustained recovery. Unfortunately, the reactionary nature of the
policies pursued by the Aquino government resulted in perverse outcomes like the cutting of funds
for essential infrastructure development, limited administration support to the agencies associated
with the Marcos government, the institution of structures that guaranteed unstable bureaucracies,
and so on. It only took about five years before institutional bottlenecks emerged that crippled the
economy. One important example of an outcome of such misguided policies was the electricity
power supply crisis in 1991, when on average 12 hours of power outages occurred daily in Metro
Manila.1 Another is when the Aquino government declared that it will pay all the external debts
of the country, including the illegitimate debts incurred by the Marcos government, thus crowding
out essential funds from basic social services. It took the Philippine government 32 years to fully
pay the debt (principal and interests) incurred to build the mothballed Bataan Nuclear Power Plant
– the initial project cost was US$ 500 million. The Aquino government also faced a series of coup
attempts between 1987 and 1989 and natural disasters in the early 1990s, both contributing to the
domestic insecurity. The combination of economic, political, and natural instabilities that plagued
the Philippines produced the doldrums that pushed the economy into another economic recession
in 1992. Once again, the crises and ensuing capital flight took part in aborting economic takeoff.
By 1993, the outlook became positive after the quick resolution of the electricity supply
crisis. Initial fears of the business sector that Mr. Fidel Ramos would setup a pseudo military
government were quickly doused off with his no-nonsense leadership, work ethic, and steadfast
actions to introduce reforms, highlighted by the introduction of wide-scale – sometimes painful –
programs to deregulate key sectors and industries and embark aggressively on trade and financial
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liberalization. In fact, the Ramos government turned out to be a period of relative economic and
political stability, attracting large investment flows, raising confidence in the economy to record
heights, and producing rapid economic growth.
Despite the positive developments in the 1990s, scholars point out that some aspects were
overlooked. While economic performances were commendable as the Philippines experienced its
longest streak of expansion during the Ramos government, economic growth was concentrated in
a few industries (particularly, electronics), while large segments of Filipino society did not benefit
from the rosy developments nor actively contributing to sustain the growth. Moreover, on closer
inspection, one finds that economic reforms were introduced with limited complementary build
up of the requisite prudential regulations and the upgrading of the institutional infrastructures to
handle the new conditions shaped by the constellation of deregulation, financial liberalization, and
globalization. Also, as the institutional setup that guaranteed unstable bureaucracies matured, it
ensured that the possibilities for long-term economic planning were limited. Problems manifested
as the continuity in the programs were compromised as short-term programming was encouraged
rather than long-term objectives. Uncertainties even filtered into administrative positions from the
Minister and, in some cases, down to Directors of Ministries as politicization intensified. These
positions became coterminous to the presidency, thus the timeframe of planning cover at best six
years. In short, the façade of economic robustness was vacuous when examined on its institutional
setup that a shock in 1997 could easily spoil another attempt at economic takeoff.
As the 1997 Asian Crisis intensified, economic growth of the Philippines dropped to zero.
As expected, capital consolidated in safe foreign locations and, as in the past, domestic conditions
contracted even more. Fortunately, there was not much capital accumulated since the early 1990s
to fuel capital flight that the amount that fled the country was not as large as those experienced by
other Asian countries. The impact of the Asian Crisis was also relatively smaller when compared
to the other Asian countries. Nonetheless, the Asian Crisis was enough to prove that by the 1990s
the economic foundations of the Philippines remained weak, not as strong as government pundits
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declared them to be. The Ramos government did not lack efforts to jump start the economy. It
even went on to push for amendments in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, arguing that the poor
structures in the country are products of the nationalistic provisions. But those efforts erupted in a
political crisis as the public realized that these were actually attempts at removing the term limits
of elected officials and remain in power after 1998, establishing in the end a Marcos-like regime.
What thus looked as a different context in the 1990s was on closer analysis the same economic
boom-and-bust cycle that the Philippines experienced since the 1980s. As in the past, a bust meant
a booming capital flight, and vice versa, in which the cycle only decreased in the latter stages of a
crisis when most of the capital had already left. Similarly, political crisis intensified capital flight,
while political stability moderated it.
Political optimism returned with the election of Mr. Joseph Estrada to the presidency, but
his government was quickly frustrated it failed to institute substantial policies. Mr. Estrada’s propoor agenda and an unprecedented popularity were not capitalized to embark on serious reforms
and broad-based programs. Exposes that the president relied on his midnight-drinking buddies for
national policies, and then in 1999, that Mr. Estrada was involved in the small-numbers gambling
(including receipts of payments from the gambling syndicates) produced widespread revulsion
that caused his impeachment in 2000. Despite ongoing economic recovery in the immediate postAsian Crisis period, the political crises hampered the economy from growth accelerations that cost
its economic takeoff. What was thus produced in the late 1990s into 2000 in terms of capital flight
was much like the earlier experiences of the Philippines, wherein political and economic panic
made capital flee, contributing to worsen the domestic conditions, and further inducing capital to
flee. By 2000, when the impact of the 1997 Asian Crisis was starting to dissipate and the affected
economies in the region were recovering fast, the Philippines somehow could not regain its earlier
momentum of economic recovery. Economic growth has been encouraging since 2000, but it still
concealed shallow, narrow and hollow economic performances, which constrain the country from
raising to higher growth trajectories. Again, capital flight has persisted and remained large after
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the 1990s.
3. FRAMEWORK
People perceive of capital flight as money running away from a country and going into haven
places abroad to avoid government taxation, wealth expropriation, or unfavourable developments;
to search for a better treatment of and investment returns to capital; or some other reasons. People
also have a notion that flight is something illicit or illegal. Such commonsensical interpretations
are valid; but they are rather difficult to translate into some rigorous form for estimation. This
paper takes a definition of capital flight that was presented in Beja (2006a: 265), as “movement of
capital from a resource-scare developing country to avoid social control” or losses due to higher
domestic risks and uncertainties.2 This definition raises some problems because capital flight is
not only an expression of disapproval of prevailing domestic conditions, it is also a manifestation
of hidden motives, and both are inherently difficult if not impossible to quantify. As such, Boyce
and Ndikumana (2001), Epstein (2005), and Beja (2006a) use a proxy measure of capital flight.
The cost of capital flight is measured in terms of its impacts on long-term macroeconomic
performances, particularly on the Philippines, for which estimates of capital flight are available in
Beja (2006a).3 But to carry out the calculations, it is necessary to use counterfactual assumptions.
The first assumption is that the socio-economic and political conditions under the counterfactual
are not only desirable but also constructive in obtaining what might have been the macroeconomic
circumstances in the Philippines if the alternative settings happened. Another assumption is that if
the capital did not flee the country it was not held in financial assets but was utilized to finance
productive domestic investments, and by extension, all capital inflows were utilized in productive
endeavors. These assumptions are important in order to obtain ideal scenario that the Philippines
could have realized, again, if the alternative settings happened. Of course, the counterargument to
the counterfactual is that crises would inevitably affect the Philippines after a period of economic
expansion, that the country experience deteriorations in economic performances by the late-1990s,
or that the capital are actually not utilized properly, and so on. But the point of the counterfactual
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is that if a deceleration indeed happened, it would not be as dramatic as that experienced by the
Philippines in the 1980s to 1990s. Implicit in the counterfactual is that some adjustments could
have been done to avert an economic debacle. Likewise, the point of the counterfactual is that
some adjustments could have been done on the way capital was employed if it were not exploited
fully. In short, under the counterfactual, the calculations reveal what the potential macroeconomic
performances might have been in the alternative scenarios. As such, the difference between the
counterfactual and actual performances would measure the lost opportunities or, in this case, the
cost of the capital flight.
The starting point in the calculations is to take capital flight (KF) estimates as though the
amounts were available for domestic productive investments (henceforth, KF-qua-investments).
Accordingly, KF suggest the lost resources that did not contribute to the expansion of domestic
production or the improvements in domestic social welfares. Similarly, the accumulated capital
flight is lost resources that did not contribute to the tax revenues of the government. Given the
fiscal constraints in the Philippines, lost tax revenues represent foregone public infrastructures,
health services, and basic education that are crucial for engendering long-term economic growth.
In the same manner, too, the lost resources are funds that were no longer be available for external
debt servicing, making the social burden of debt heavier, which in turn contributing to aggravate
the resource mobilization problems of the Philippines. In such and other related considerations,
therefore, capital flight undermines macroeconomic integrity of the country.
The potential additional output (Y) if the KF-qua-investment was engaged is obtained by
multiplying KF of the Philippines with the reciprocal of the country’s incremental capital-output
ratio (ICOR), obtaining the year-on-year potential output due to KF.4 Since KF-qua-investments
provide a stream, a more sophisticated calculation encompasses the accumulated increases in Yi
over time due to each year KF-qua-investments and adjusted for depreciation. 5 For instance, in
the present period, KF1 increases output as defined by basic formula, but the same KF1 further
increases output in the succeeding periods, but not as high as in the first period because of the
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depreciations on the initial KF-qua-investment. The same process continues until KF1 becomes
fully depreciated at some future period. The same reasoning applies also for KF2 in the second
period, and so on of other KF amounts in the following years – they also generate increases in
output in the year KF was initially put to use and the following years until KF-qua-investment is
fully depreciated. 6
Lastly, a further set of calculations are done using Philippine KF-qua-investments with an
identified counterfactual economy’s ICOR. The key step here is therefore to identify that country
with proximate socio-economic characteristics as the Philippines. But the same equation is used
to obtain the potential output. In particular, Thailand was chosen as the counterfactual economy
of the Philippines because the former is known as the “twin” economy of the latter, as both share
commonalities in their population sizes, resource endowments, the extent of integration with the
international economy, just to mention a few (see, e.g., Oshima 1987). In fact, in recent years, the
two countries share similarities in their policy trajectories, particularly deregulation and financial
liberalization (see, e.g., Bello 2004). Because of this feature, Balicasan (2006) also used Thailand
as counterfactual economy when calculating the costs of rapid population growth to Philippines
economic growth. In a way, the Philippine ICOR obtains the minimum scenarios of lost output,
while the Thailand ICOR obtains the maximum scenario of lost output. What is obtained from the
calculations does not yet include the long-term social impacts of capital flight, which can enlarge
the total costs, so the figures presented give an indication of the magnitude of the losses due to
capital flight in this case.
4. THE INCONVENIENT RESULT
This section presents the analysis of the cost of capital flight between 1970 and 1999. Estimates
of capital flight are taken from Beja (2006) and presented in Figure 1 (not the figures in Table 1).
Other relevant data were compiled from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the
Philippine Statistical Yearbooks. Figure 1 thus presents the trends in capital flight, which includes
all the possible adjustments as identified by the literature.7 For the 1970s, the total amount was
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USD 16 billion. The figures increased in the 1980s, reaching the total of USD 36 billion – the low
levels in 1989 and 19990 reflects the “reversal” of capital flight that was pointed out earlier. Over
the 1990s, capital flight reached became even larger, especially after the mid-1990s. Total capital
flight for the decade was USD 43 billion. Thus, between 1970 and 1999, US$ 95 billion was lost
to capital flight.
Figure 1: Capital Flight from the Philippines (in US$ Millions, 1995 Prices)
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Table 2 presents capital flight and the calculated potential outputs using the Philippine and
Thailand ICORs, respectively, on KF-qua-investments. Between 1970 and 1999, the average
potential was US$ 432 million using Philippine ICOR and US$ 864 million using Thai ICOR.
Table 2 also shows that that bigger potential output could be had in the 1990s if the Philippines
had the counterfactual setup of Thailand. Then with Table 2, the potential economic growth rates
of the Philippines were calculated, and the results are in Table 3. Clearly, higher growth rates
would have been possible with KF-qua-investments, with an average of 1 per cent higher than the
actual performance using Philippine ICORs or an average of 2.3 per cent when using the Thai
ICORs. It is also interesting to note that the 2.3 figure is similar to the result reported by
Balisacan (2006) obtained using econometric techniques. In fact, the figures for 1970s and 1980s
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in Table 2 using only Philippine ICOR give an average of 0.9 percentage point higher growth
rate, which is also what Lamberte, et al (1992) obtained using gap analysis for the same period.
Table 2: Capital Flight and Potential Output, in US$ Millions; 1995 Prices
5-year Ave.: 1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
1990-94
1995-99

Capital flight
903
5,800
11,936
8,733
5,946
14,210

Phil. Output 1
41
310
699
713
230
600

Phil. Output 2
76
399
789
897
1,153
1,870

10-year Ave.: 1970-79
1980-89
1990-99

3,352
10,335
10,078

176
706
415

237
843
1,512

30-year Ave: 1970-99
7,922
432
Note: Source of capital flight data is Beja (2006a); calculations of the author.

864

From Table 2, the growth pattern using the Thai ICOR suggests a smoother trajectory of
economic growth. As such, possible growth accelerations can be had. To capture the acceleration
effects on the growth figures, a further calculation was done on the results from the Thai ICOR,
particularly by calibrating the Thai ICOR results using the differences in the actual and
counterfactual economic growth rates to obtain compounded growth rates. The results shown in
Table 3 suggest that the Philippines could have reached much higher averages, reaching 6.2
percent for the period 1970 to 1999, which is comparable to the average growth rate of Indonesia
at 6.1 per cent, Malaysia at 6.7 per cent, or Thailand at 6.5 per cent.
Table 3: Capital Flight and Economic Performance
5-year Ave.: 1970-74
1975-79
1980-84
1985-89
1990-94
1995-99

Actual growth
5.4
6.2
1.4
2.7
1.9
3.7

Growth-1
6.0
6.8
2.5
4.0
2.2
4.5

Growth-2
6.1
6.9
4.8
6.2
4.8
5.8

Adj. Growth-2
6.1
7.0
5.1
6.7
5.4
6.7

10-year Ave.: 1970-79
1980-89
1990-99

5.8
2.0
2.8

6.5
3.2
3.3

6.6
5.5
5.3

6.6
5.9
6.1

30-year Ave: 1970-99
3.6
4.5
5.9
6.2
Note: Actual growth figures are from the World Development Indicators. Growth-1 uses Philippine ICOR,
Growth-2 uses Thailand ICOR, and Adj. Growth-2 is Growth-2 accounting for possible acceleration effects.
Calculations of the author.
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Of course, if the contribution of past crises or constraints (e.g., the results of Balisacan
(2006)) to potential output and economic growth were factored in the calculations, the adjusted
figures would be much higher. The point to stress is that the potential outputs – hence, the lost
opportunities – between 1970 and 1999 were quite significant to be simply dismissed as bygones.
Therefore, the conclusion from Tables 2 and 3 is clear: Philippine economic performances could
have been higher and comparable to the fast growing Southeast Asian economic tigers if the lost
resources (in this case, capital flight) were channelled into domestic productive endeavours. In
addition, based on the five-year and decade growth averages, Philippine economic performances
could have been a lot more stable that would have sustained economic expansions over the long
term. Given these results, the capital flight therefore means large lost opportunities. Considering
that in the counterfactual scenario the Philippines could have realized an Asian economic tiger
status, one important implication with these calculations is a failed economic takeoff.
5. LET BYGONES BE BYGONES?
The calculations above demonstrate that capital flight means lost resources, which result in lost
outputs. In the case of the Philippines, sustained capital flight points to serious problems that are
unaddressed, the more serious ones are: the disinterest or unwillingness of investors to put funds
into productive domestic endeavours, the reluctance of the banking sector in providing credit to
those who want to undertake domestic production, a bureaucracy crippled by corruption and
public distrust on the government, unending domestic political crises characterized by pointless
squabbles in the government, reversals in policies done for political survival and expediency, and
absence of an autonomous political base for carrying out government programs. These issues
reinforce the prevailing uneasiness that the leadership has compromised the direction of policies
in the Philippines. They also strengthen doubts about the ability of the leadership to shepherd the
country to sustained economic recovery and ultimately realize real improvements in the social
conditions of Filipinos. As such, capital flows are short-term that finance speculative endeavours
(e.g., stock and property markets) or non-productive activities (e.g., consumption binges), fuelling
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financial and asset bubbles, encouraging risky behaviour, and in the end, producing economic
crises. Similarly, as the volumes of resource flow increase and as their streams fluctuate, more of
the funds end up being misallocated, especially because they are not supported with productive
investment opportunities. Resource flows also take advantage of the opportunities made available
by deregulation and financial liberalization. Given the nature of crises, economic conditions are
further deteriorated with capital flight, thus aggravating the reductions in domestic investments,
intensifying uncertainties, and so on, generating more capital flight and aggravating the economic
contraction. Hence, crises in the Philippines are not only repetitive but also extended. So the costs
are magnified. There are therefore a lot of opportunities lost.
Even though the recent economic conditions indicate that robust performances have been
realized, the increasing resource flows can still end up contributing to capital flight given that
there are now wider avenues for flight with deregulation and financial liberalization. At the same
time, the ever larger amounts of capital fleeing the country become much more difficult to control
and slowly impinge on government capacities to effectively regulate domestic economic activities
for the public welfare. Actually, the government misjudges the situation of increasing resource
flows in trade and finance as votes of confidence to the state-of-affairs in the Philippines. It thus
fails to see the increasing volumes of capital fleeing the country and concludes that its withdrawal
from active management of the economy is in the right direction. In turn, when the government
finds the need to intervene, it is unable to do so as capital would go on strike against any form of
regulation. With government capacities weakened, capital strikes are more effective mechanisms
in further disarm the government. Because of this disappointment, the government then embarks
on self-deprecation for embarking the role of an economic manager.
In the end, the results presented earlier support the contention that capital flight played an
important role for the difficulties that the Philippines faced in trying to realize economic take-off.
The crises that inflicted the Philippines and the capital flight that ensued made things worse in the
country.
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Given the large costs, it is logical to argue that government action is needed to redress the
situation. There is a thus need to rethink what government interventions mean in the Philippines.
Contrary to the current thinking that the withdrawal of the government is desirable, it is rather
important to re-articulate and re-define the role of the government today. It goes without saying
that the government remains the only institution that is capable of wielding an influence on the
behaviour of various players in society and how institutions work, including the market. Of
course, some adjustments are needed for the government to maintain solid foundations to carry
out its role and for it to negotiate effectively the various challenges on its role. Such mandate is
important because an unsuccessful government faces increasing pressures to remove itself from
further participation in the economy; in turn, the government’s exit make it much weaker and
ineffective or worse, it becomes a failure. A failed government finds that it is unable to regain
stability, secure the economy, or provide quality basic services. If the government casually waits
for other non-state agents (including the market) or for events to produce the stability and security
for them, it is bound to fail. A government that refuses to act fails. A weakening government finds
it increasingly difficult to maintain the level of effectiveness it once enjoyed. While a government
that allow non-state agents and developments in the global economy and polity to undermine its
autonomy and capacities finds that it degenerates quickly that, in the end, it too fails. Where the
government becomes weak or fails, it violates the fundamental human rights and liberties of its
citizens to a decent, meaningful, and substantive existence. In these cases, the government is
responsible for the injustice and misery of the people.
In the context of capital flight, a first step to reclaiming the capacity of the government is
the re-introduction of capital flow management techniques. Yet this intervention should not be
interpreted as a reversion to economic repression. Rather, the goal for introducing such techniques
is to regain effective management of the direction of policies and the economy. Regulations on
resource flows are needed because unregulated capital is dangerous in the long run. As another
example, capital controls can be applied as a tool to restrain capital and, in the process, direct the
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resources into the productive sectors of the economy. In other words, maintaining control over the
resource flows is essential for commodity production to occur. Capital controls can also be used
as a screening mechanism, for instance, to discourage short-term or speculative inflows but to
encourage long-term inflows to support industrialization, deepen capital accumulation, and push
the economy to higher levels of production to maintain a high growth path. In the process, capital
management techniques can remove the vulnerabilities to financial swings, panic and contagion;
in the process, insulate the economy from destructive capital, avert crises, but more importantly,
purge capital flight.
Part of this rethinking is to understand that the Philippine government needs to guarantee
the domestic interests. Economic targets and development need to consider the historical, sociocultural and institutional realities in the Philippines. At the same time, the government must also
secure broad-based macroeconomic performances. In other words, the economy must be able to
reach high levels of outputs and also provide jobs to Filipinos. It must regain autonomy so that
constructive engagements with domestic and external demands both to the government itself and
to the execution of government functions. It must be decisive in regulating economic and social
processes that are counter-productive to realizing a robust macroeconomy and in dealing with
attempts to undermine its capacities. It must maintain sound economic and macro-organizational
foundations. It must also allow for constructive partnerships with the private sector and the civil
society. It must not obstruct initiatives toward broad-based progress. In short, the best approach is
for the Philippine government is to continuously adapt – to redefine and refine its role – to the
changing conditions to maintain autonomy and capacities, to successfully negotiate globalization,
but more importantly, to provide the needs of the Filipinos. Policies based on compromises are
not helpful. Therefore, the government must rethink its role if it wants to remain relevant.
The results revealing the large potential output with KF-qua-investments is manifestation
of the costs of an anti-development Philippine government and an economy that is caught in a
saga of crises and capital flight. There is thus a need to challenge the Philippine government to
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take up decisive policy actions to regain control of the economy and stabilize the political crises.
Progressive policies that bring about robust macroeconomic performances to pull the economy
out from its present low growth path are imperative. Given that the costs of capital flight are
large, government intervention must be demanded. As such, it is very important that Filipino
progressives confront their government with unsympathetic criticisms, even to the extent of
condemning the current direction of policies to “open the government’s eyes” to the need to have
sound governance but not revert to economic repression. It is also very important to challenge the
Philippine government to re-think about how reforms have been executed, to think about how to
reform the reforms, to remove the internal and external vulnerabilities, to establish autonomy, and
to maintain an effective political base to carry out its programs. Yet, it is equally important to be
vigilant when engaging the government in the re-thinking process so that actions are not taken to
divert attention from dealing with the causes of economic weaknesses, identifying the legitimate
alternatives, and pursuing the broad-based reforms. This advocacy is crucial for meaningful and
collective engagements among all the stakeholders in the country. Finally, the government must
be brought back into the centre-stage of policy-making and discussions. Unless the Philippine
government responds pro-actively, it is condemning the country to the perpetuity of crises, the
continuity of the narrow, shallow and hollow macroeconomic performances, the permanence of
poverty of the Filipinos, and the failure to realize economic takeoff.
Let Bygones be Bygones
What can be said of the Philippines in the 21st Century? If capital flight slowed down or
reversed since 2000, would it be possible to discount the past and consider the present prospects
of the Philippines for economic growth? Unfortunately, recent estimates find that more capital
flight occurred since 2000, and there are indications that the state of affairs to continue in the
coming years (see, e.g., Beja 2007). As in the past, economic and political crises pushed capital to
flee to avoid the unfavourable developments in the country. It is expected that the tendency for
capital to flee is much stronger today with a financially liberalized economy and more determined
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efforts at removing the remaining restraints on capital flows. As in the past, the impact of capital
flight during crises is to enhance the consequences of crises, thereby not only increasing the costs
but also prolonging the outcomes. Again, because elite are able to move elsewhere to both shelter
themselves from harm and their wealth from the unfavourable developments in the country, the
burden is necessarily and disproportionately imposed on the majority of the Filipinos. For as long
as the capital flows in a revolving manner (see, e.g., Boyce 1992; Beja 2006b) and the government
is convinced that the situation is acceptable in a financially liberalized environment, Philippine
economic performances cannot reach full throttle. In addition, resource flows will end up in nonproductive domestic endeavours. Lastly, unless the Philippine government regains control of the
macroeconomic conditions in the country, the Philippines will continue on a low growth path and
violate the fundamental rights of Filipinos to a decent, meaningful, and substantive existence. In
these cases, the Philippine government is responsible for the injustices and miseries of Filipinos.
6. CONCLUSION
The Philippines has experienced capital flight since the 1970s, and studies have shown that it
continues to experience this problem today. If the capital flight was used to finance productive
domestic endeavours (i.e., KF-qua-investments), the results presented in this paper suggest that
the Philippines would have realized stronger macroeconomic performances. The average loss in
output was calculated at US$ 432 million to US$ 864 million, or an average loss in growth rate of
between 1 per cent to 2.3 per cent, between 1970 and 1999. Computing the compound growth rate
that would be possible with stable growth over three decades, the Philippines could have reached
an average of 6.2 per cent, a level comparable to the Southeast Asian miracle economies. Such
figures could also mean the amount of lost welfare of the average Filipino, who could have been
raised out of poverty.
In the case of the Philippines, capital flight therefore is an important factor to consider in
understanding why it failed to sustain rapid economic growth and realize economic takeoff. When
the Philippines was already lagging behind on the economic ladder, capital flight played a role in
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pulled the country several rungs further down. Of course, unending political crises contributed to
propel capital to flee. Yet it is clear from the results is that sustained capital flight over a long
period ultimately meant a lost and arguably an unrecoverable lost opportunities. Unless decisive
policy actions are taken up by the Philippine government today to reverse the current dismal trend
of economic growth, the Philippines will remain in perpetuity of crises, hollowed out, trapped in
poverty, and fail to realize economic takeoff.
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ENDNOTES
1

The National Capital Region remains to be the center of economic production in the Philippines,

contributing at least a third of gross domestic product in 2006.
2

See Cumby and Levich (1987), Gordon and Levine (1989), Claessens and Naude (1993), Chang

et al. (1997), Kant (2002), and Beja (2005) for discussions covering definitions and measurements
of capital flight. As Boyce (1993) and Beja (2006a) elaborate, social control refers to the actual or
potential, including formal and informal, regulations on the use of resources, covering the
expectations and norms on the use of foreign exchange, the extra-legal exactions on capital, the
capacity of the government to direct resources into domestic productive endeavors, among others.
See also Bowles and Gintis (1988) for a related use of social control.
3

Detailed estimation procedures and results are presented in Beja (2006a), and regression analysis

on the same dataset is available in Beja (2006b) using the procedure presented in Boyce (1992)
for the Philippines. Also, Boyce and Ndikumana (2001), Epstein (2005), and Beja (2006a) use the
same procedure for estimating capital flight.
4

ICOR is a measure of the marginal efficiency of capital; that is, how much output can be had for

a unit of capital in production, all other things held constant. Five year averages of the ICORs are
used in the calculations. In addition to assuming productive domestic investments, the following
are also important: there is an exogenous demand for investments; and the sectoral impact of KFqua-investment is the same across sectors (i.e., there is fixed proportion in factor inputs).
Researchers on the Philippines agree that the country is immersed in a vicious supplyside cycle in which capital scarcity lowers economic growth, aggravating the capital scarcity
problem and limiting investments even more. Using the ICOR in the counterfactual calculations
is consistent with this supply-side problem argument. It is also assumed that the sectoral impact
of KF-qua-investment is the same across all economic sectors, or the best case scenario. “Capital
scarcity” refers to the lack of financial resources and infrastructural underdevelopment, while
23

“infrastructure” refers to the physical and social capitals. See, e.g., Pastor (1990), Lopez (1996),
and Vos and Yap (1996) for related techniques in calculating the lost output.

5

Mathematically, the formula is Yt =

KFt +

∑

t −1
m =1

∏

KFm[

ICORt

m −1
n =1

(1 − dm )]

, where t is the present

period, m is the time period up to (t-1), n is time up to (m-1), d is the depreciation rate, and Π is
the product operator.
6

Estimates are sensitive to the starting point of the calculations. Also, a five-year moving average

was used in the calculation. KF-qua-investment will be fully depreciated in some future period. If
it is assumed that the capital flight was invested in financial assets, say, abroad before it was used
in the domestic economy, the accumulation of foreign assets plus accrued earnings must be used
in the numerator; that is, CSKFt + dSKFt-1, where SKF is the stock of capital flight imputed using
a rate of return; CSKF is the change in SKF; and d is the depreciation rate.
7

Recall, the basic formula is KF = CDET+NFI-CAD-CRES, where CDET is the flow of debt-

related capital, NFI is the flow of non-debt capital, CAD is the current account deficit, and CRES
is the accumulation of international reserves. In Table 1, KF was adjusted for trade misinvoicing,
or MIS. The extended formula for computing capital flight is KF = CDETADJ+NFIADJ-CADADJCRESADJ, where the subscript ADJ refers to the adjusted value. Details on how to calculate the
adjustments are available in Boyce and Ndikumana (2001) and Beja (2006a).
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